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ADMISSIBILITY AND COMMON BELIEF
GEIR B. ASHEIM AND MARTIN DUFWENBERG
Abstract. The concept of ‘fully permissible sets’ is deﬁned by an algo-
rithm that eliminates strategy subsets. It is characterized as choice sets
when there iscommon certain belief of the event that each player prefer
one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the
latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice
sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The concept reﬁnes the
Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and capturesas pectsof forward induction.
JEL Classiﬁcation Number: C72.
1. Introduction
Two diﬀerent, but related, ideas have re-occurred in deductive game-
theoretic analysis:
1. A player should prefer one strategy to another if the former weakly
dominates the latter. Such admissibility of a player’s preferences —
which can be referred to as ‘caution’since it means that all opponent
strategies are taken into account — has been defended by e.g. Luce &
Raiﬀa ([32], Ch. 13) and is implicit in any procedure that starts out
by eliminating all weakly dominated strategies.
2. A player should deem any opponent strategy that is a rational choice
inﬁnitely more likely (in the sense of Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel
[15], Def. 5.1) than any opponent strategy not having this property.
This is equivalent to saying that a player should prefer one strategy to
another if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of rational
choices for the opponent. Such admissibility of a player’s preferences
— which will here be referred to as ‘full belief of opponent rationality’
— is a key ingredient in the analyses of weak dominance by Samuelson
[37] and B¨ orgers & Samuelson [19], and is essentially satisﬁed by pro-
cedures, like ‘extensive form rationalizabiliy’(EFR, cf. Pearce [35] and
Battigalli [9, 10]) and ‘iterated elimination of (all) weakly dominated
strategies’(IEWDS), that promote forward induction.
The present paper presents an analysis that combines these ideas in the
following manner. A player’s preferences over his own strategies, which
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depend both on his payoﬀ function and on his beliefs about the strategy
choice of his opponent, leads to a choice set (i.e. a set of maximal strategies).
A player’s preferences will be said to be fully admissibly consistent with the
preferences of his opponent if one strategy is preferred to another if and only
if the former weakly dominates the latter
• on the set of all opponent strategies (i.e. ‘caution’), or
• on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the oppo-
nent (i.e. ‘full belief of opponent rationality’).
A subset of strategies is a fully permissible set if and only if it can be a
choice set when there is common certain belief of full admissible consistency,
where an event is ‘certainly believed’if the complement is Savage-null (cf.
subsect. 3.3). Hence, the analysis yields a solution concept that determines
a collection of strategy subsets – a family of choice sets – for each player.
1.1. An Illustration. We will use G1 of Fig. 1 to illustrate the conse-
quences of imposing ‘caution’and ‘full belief of opponent rationality’ . The
reader may want to study the example and decide what is a “reasonable”
outcome before reading on. Since ‘caution’means that each player takes
all opponent strategies into account, it follows that player 1’s preferences
over his strategies will be U ∼ M   D (where ∼ and   denote indiﬀerence
and preference, respectively). Player 1 must prefer each of the strategies U
and M to the strategy D, because the former strategies weakly dominate
D. Hence, U and M are maximal, implying that 1’s choice set is {U,M}.
The requirement of ‘full belief in opponent rationality’comes into eﬀect
when considering the preferences of player 2. Suppose that 2 is certain that
1 is cautious. What will 2’s preferences over her strategies be? Since 2 (as
indicated above) should ﬁgure out that {U,M} is 1’s choice set, 2 should
deem each element of {U,M} inﬁnitely more likely than D. This is captured
by our assumption that 2 has full belief of 1’s rationality. It amounts to
the requirement that 2’s preferences should respect weak dominance on 1’s
choice set {U,M}, regardless of what happens if 1 chooses D. Hence, 2’s
preferences over her strategies will be L   R.
Summing up, common certain belief of full admissible consistency leads
to the following solution for G1:
1’s preferences: U ∼ M   D
2’s preferences: L   R
This means that {U,M} is the unique fully permissible set for player 1 and
{L} is the unique fully permissible set for player 2.
1.2. Related Concepts. Several solution concepts with natural epistemic
foundations fail to match this prediction. In the case of rationalizability
(Bernheim [14], Pearce [35]) — which in 2-player games corresponds to iter-
ated elimination of strongly dominated strategies — this is perhaps not so
surprising. Rationalizability can be understood as a consequence of ‘common





1, 1 1, 1
1, 1 1, 0
1, 0 0, 1
Figure 1. An illustration (G1).
[39]), so there is no guarantee that a player always prefers one strategy to
another if the former weakly dominates the latter. As an illustration, the
strategy D in G1 can be rationalized by 1 believing that 2 chooses L (which
in turn can be rationalized by 2 believing that 1 chooses U or M, etc.). This
contradicts that 1 is cautious and chooses a strategy in his choice set.
It is perhaps more surprising that the concept of ‘permissibility’does not
match our solution of G1. Permissibility can be given rigorous epistemic
foundations in models where the players are cautious (cf. B¨ orgers [18], and
especially Brandenburger [20] who coined the term ‘permissible’; see also
Ben-Porath [12] and Gul [30]). In these models players take into account all
opponent strategies, while assigning more weight to a subset of those oppo-
nent strategies they deem to be rational choices for the opponent. Permis-
sibility implies that only strategies that survive the so-called DF procedure
(after Dekel & Fudenberg [24]) — one round of elimination of (all) weakly
dominated strategies followed by iterated elimination of strongly dominated
strategies — can be chosen. In G1, this means that 1 cannot choose his
weakly dominated strategy D. However, in contrast to our solution where
2 prefers L to R, permissibility allows that 2 chooses R. To exemplify us-
ing Brandenburger’s [20] approach, this will be the case if 2 deems U to be
inﬁnitely more likely than D which in turn is deemed inﬁnitely more likely
than M. The problem is that our requirement of ‘full belief of opponent ra-
tionality’is not satisﬁed: Player 2 deems D more likely than M even though
M is in 1’s choice set, while D is not. In Sect. 2 we establish as a general
result (Prop. 2) that the concept of fully permissible sets reﬁnes the DF
procedure.
The procedure of IEWDS yields the same conclusion in G1 as do the
concept of fully permissible sets. However, the concept of fully permissible
sets neither reﬁnes nor is reﬁned by the procedure of IEWDS (see G3 in
Sect. 2 for a proof by example).
We shall use two games — ‘Battle-of-the-sexes-with-an-outside-option’
(G2) and ‘Burning money’( G4) — to illustrate how the concept of fully
permissible sets captures a notion of forward induction, although by an
argument that diﬀers from the one that usually applies. The usual forward
induction argument is illustrated in these games by the procedure of IEWDS
and the concept of EFR. The latter concept has recently been given an
epistemic foundation by Battigalli & Siniscalchi [11]. In Sect. 6 we will4 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND MARTIN DUFWENBERG
explain how our epistemic analysis diﬀers from theirs and compare our work
to other related literature.
1.3. Organization ofthe Paper. Section 2 formally deﬁnes the concept of
fully permissible sets through an algorithm that eliminates strategy sets that
cannot be choice sets under full admissible consistency. General existence as
well as other properties are shown. Section 3 introduces epistemic operators,
which are used in Sect. 4 to establish an epistemic foundation for the concept
of fully permissible sets through the requirement of common certain belief of
full admissible consistency. Section 5 contains further examples, while Sect.
6 concludes. Some technical material (including the proofs) are contained
in two appendices. For ease of presentation, the analysis will be limited to
2-player games. This is mostly a matter of convenience as everything can
be generalized to n-player games (with n>2).
2. An Algorithm
We present in this section an algorithm — ‘iterated elimination of choice
sets under full admissible consistency’(IECFA) — leading to the concept of
‘fully permissible sets’. This concept will in turn be given an epistemic char-
acterization in Sect. 4 by imposing common certain belief of full admissible
consistency. We present the algorithm before the epistemic characterization
for diﬀerent reasons:
• IECFA is fairly accessible. By deﬁning it early, we can apply it early,
and so oﬀer early indications of the nature of the solution concept that
we wish to promote.
• To deﬁne IECFA is to point to a parallel between our approach and the
concepts of rationalizable strategies and permissible strategies. Even
though they are motivated by epistemic assumptions, both concepts
turn out to be identical in 2-player games to the set of strategies sur-
viving simple algorithms: respectively, iterated elimination of strongly
dominated strategies (IESDS) and the DF procedure.
• Just like IESDS and the DF procedure, IECFA is much easier to use
than the corresponding epistemic characterizations. The algorithm
should be a handy tool for applied economists who may wish to see it
presented early and then spend less time on the details of Sect. 4.
IESDS and the DF procedure iteratively eliminate dominated strategies.
In the corresponding epistemic models, these strategies in turn cannot be
rational choices, cannot be rational choices given that other players do not
use strategies that cannot be rational choices, etc. IECFA is also an elim-
ination procedure. However, the interpretation of the basic item thrown
out is not that of a strategy that cannot be a rational choice, but rather
that of as e tof strategies that cannot be the set of maximal strategies (i.e.,
a choice set; cf. subsects. 2.2 and 3.5) for any preferences that are in a
given sense consistent with the preferences of the opponent. The speciﬁc
kind of consistency involved in IECFA — which will be deﬁned in Sect. 4.2ADMISSIBILITY AND COMMON BELIEF 5
and referred to as ‘full admissible consistency’— requires that a player’ s
preferences are characterized by the properties of ‘caution’and ‘full belief of
opponent rationality’. Thus, IECFA does not start with each player’s strat-
egy set and then iteratively eliminates strategies. Rather, IECFA starts with
each player’s collection of non-empty subsets of his strategy set and then
iteratively eliminates subsets that cannot be choice sets when the players’
preferences satisfy the requirement of ‘full admissible consistency’.
2.1. A Strategic Game. With N = {1,2} as the set of players,l e t ,f o r
each i, Si denote player i’s ﬁnite set of pure strategies and ui : S → R be
a vNM utility function that assigns payoﬀ to any strategy vector, where
S = S1 × S2 is the set of strategy vectors. Then G =( Si,u i)i∈N is a ﬁnite
strategic two-player game.W r i t epi, ri,a n dsi (∈ Si) for pure strategies and
xi and yi (∈ ∆(Si)) for mixed strategies. Since ui is a vNM utility function,
we may extend ui to mixed strategies: ui(xi,s j)=

si∈Si xi(si)ui(si,s j).
2.2. Deﬁnition. Say that xi weakly dominates yi on Qj (⊆ Sj)i f ,∀sj ∈ Qj,
ui(xi,s j) ≥ ui(yi,s j), with strict inequality for some sj ∈ Qj. Say that
player i’s preferences over his own strategies are admissible on Qj ( = ∅)i fxi
is preferred to yi whenever xi weakly dominates yi on Qj.P l a y e ri’s choice
set is the set of pure strategies that are maximal w.r.t. i’s preferences over
his own strategies: si (∈ Si)i si ni’s choice set if and only if there is no xi
(∈ ∆(Si)) such that xi is preferred to si. As indicated in subsect. 3.5, i’s
choice set is non-empty and supports any maximal mixed strategy.
In order to describe IECFA and thus deﬁne the concept of ‘fully permis-
sible sets’, let the set Qj be interpreted as the set of strategies that player i
deems to be the set of rational choices for his opponent. Assume that player
i’s preferences over his own strategies are characterized by the property of
being admissible on both Qj and Sj: xi is preferred to yi if and only if
xi weakly dominates yi on Qj or Sj.P l a y e r i’s choice set is then equal to
Si\Di(Qj), where, for any (∅  =) Qj ⊆ Sj,
Di(Qj): ={si ∈ Si|∃xi ∈ ∆(Si)s . t .xi weakly dom. si on Qj or Sj}.
Let Σ = Σ1 × Σ2, where Σi := 2Si\{∅} denotes the collection of non-empty
subsets of Si.W r i t eπi, ρi,a n dσi (∈ Σi) for subsets of pure strategies. For
any (∅  =) Ξ = Ξ1 × Ξ2 ⊆ Σ, write α(Ξ) := α1(Ξ2) × α2(Ξ1), where
αi(Ξj): ={πi ∈ Σi|∃(∅  =)Ψj ⊆ Ξj s.t. πi = Si\Di(∪σj∈Ψjσj)}.
Hence, αi(Ξj) is the collection of strategy subsets that can be choice sets for
player i if i’s preferences are characterized by the property of being admis-
sible both on the union of the strategy subsets in a non-empty subcollection
of Ξj and on the union of all opponent strategies.
We can now deﬁne the main concept of this paper.
Deﬁnition 1. Consider the sequence deﬁned by Ξ(0) = Σ and, ∀g ≥ 1,
Ξ(g)=α(Ξ(g − 1)). A non-empty strategy set πi is said to be a fully
permissible set for i if πi ∈
∞





2, 2 2, 2
3, 1 0, 0
0, 0 1, 3
Figure 2. Battle-of-the-sexes-with-an-outside-option (G2).
Let Π = Π1 × Π2 denote the collection of vectors of fully permissible sets.
Since ∅  = αi(Ξ 
j) ⊆ αi(Ξ  
j) ⊆ αi(Σj) whenever ∅  =Ξ  
j ⊆ Ξ  
j ⊆ Σj and
since the game is ﬁnite, Ξ(g) is a monotone sequence that converges to Π
in a ﬁnite number of iterations. IECFA is the procedure that in round g
eliminates sets in Ξ(g − 1)\Ξ(g) as possible choice sets. As deﬁned in Def.
1 IECFA eliminates maximally in each round in the sense that, ∀g ≥ 1,
Ξ(g)=α(Ξ(g − 1)). However, it follows from the monotonicity of αi that
any non-maximal procedure, where ∃g ≥ 1 such that Ξ(g − 1) ⊃ Ξ(g) ⊃
α(Ξ(g − 1)), will also converge to Π.
A choice set of player i survives elimination round g if it is a choice set
w.r.t. preferences that are characterized by the property of being admissible
both on the union of some (or all) of opponent choice sets that have survived
the procedure up till round g − 1 and on the set of all opponent strategies.
A fully permissible set is a choice set which will survive in this way for any
g. It will follow from the analysis of Sect. 4 that strategy subsets that
this algorithm has not eliminated by round g can be interpreted as choice
sets that are compatible with g − 1 order of mutual certain belief of full
admissible consistency.
2.3. Applications. The best way to illustrate the functioning of IECFA is
to apply it. Consider ﬁrst G1 of the introduction. We get:
Ξ(0) = Σ1 × Σ2
Ξ(1) = {{U,M}} × Σ2
Π = Ξ(2) = {{U,M}} × {{L}}.
Independently of Q2, S1\D1(Q2)={U,M},s of o r1o n l y{U,M} can survive
the ﬁrst elimination round. On the other hand, S2\D2({U,M})={L},
S2\D2({D})={R},a n dS2\D2({U})={L,R}, so that no elimination is
possible for player 2. However, in the second elimination round only {L}
survives since S2\D2({U,M})={L}. The interpretation is that (in round
2) it is impossible for R to appear in a choice set for 2. This is because (in
round 1) only {U,M} is possible as a choice set for 1, and then {L} must
be 2’s choice set since only L is a maximal element w.r.t. preferences are
admissible on {U,M} and {U,M,D}.
We now consider a diﬀerent example, the ‘Battle-of-the-sexes-with-an-
outside-option’game, which pure strategy reduced strategic form is given
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a notion of forward induction. We will return to this example on several
occasions throughout the paper. Applying IECFA we get:
Ξ(0) = Σ1 × Σ2
Ξ(1) = {{U},{M},{U,M}} × Σ2
Ξ(2) = {{U},{M},{U,M} }×{ { L},{L,R}}
Ξ(3) = {{M},{U,M} }×{ { L},{L,R}}
Ξ(4) = {{M},{U,M} }×{ { L}}
Π = Ξ(5) = {{M}} × {{L}}
We move directly to the interpretation in terms of surviving choice sets:
(Round 1) D cannot be in a choice set for 1 since this strategy is strictly
dominated. (Round 2) This implies that {R} is excluded as a choice set
for 2, since only {U}, {M},a n d{U,M} are candidates for 1’s choice set
and S2\D2(Q1)  = {R} if Q1 is the union of some (or all) of the sets {U},
{M},a n d{U,M}. (Round 3) Similarly, {U} is excluded as a choice set for
1, since only {L} and {L,R} are candidates for 2’s choice set. (Round 4)
Given this {L,R} cannot be 2’s choice set. (Round 5) Since {M} is the
set of 1’s strategies that are maximal w.r.t. preferences that are admissible
on {L},o n l y{M} survives as a choice set for player 1. Now the algorithm
c o m e st oas t o p :S2\D2({M})={L} and S1\D1({L})={M}, and hence
{M} and {L} are the fully permissible sets.
2.4. Results. The following proposition characterizes the strategy subsets
that survive IECFA and thus are fully permissible.
Proposition 1. (i) ∀i ∈ N, Πi  = ∅. (ii) Π=α(Π). (iii) ∀i ∈ N, πi ∈ Πi
if and only if there exists Ξ=Ξ 1 × Ξ2 with πi ∈ Ξi such that Ξ ⊆ α(Ξ).
Prop. 1(i) establishes existence, but not uniqueness, of each player’s fully
permissible set(s). Games with multiple strict Nash equilibria illustrate the
possibility of such multiplicity; by Prop. 1(iii), any strict Nash equilibrium
corresponds to a vector of fully permissible sets. Another (quite diﬀerent)
example of a game with multiple fully permissible sets is provided by G5 of
Sect. 5. Prop. 1(ii) means that Π is a ﬁxed point in terms of a collection of
vectors of strategy sets. By Prop. 1(iii) it is the largest such ﬁxed point.
We close this section by recording some connections between IECFA on
the one hand, and IESDS, the DF-procedure and IEWDS on the other.
First, we note through the following Prop. 2 that IECFA has more bite
than the DF procedure. G1 of the introduction as well as G2 of the present
section illustrate that this reﬁnement may be strict.
Proposition 2. A pure strategy pi is permissible (i.e., survives the DF pro-
cedure) if there exists a fully permissible set πi such that pi ∈ πi.
It follows as a corollary that IECFA has more cutting power also than IESDS,
since a strategy is rationalizable (i.e. survives the IESDS) whenever it is






1, 1 1, 1 0, 0
1, 1 0, 1 1, 0
0, 1 0, 0 2, 0
0, 0 0, 1 0, 2
Figure 3. The relation between IECFA and IEWDS (G3)
We ﬁnally compare IECFA to IEWDS. In both games discussed so far
IECFA generates the same outcome as does IEWDS. However, the proce-
dures of IECFA and IEWDS are diﬀerent. This is even indicated in G2,s i n c e
— although IECFA and IEWDS have the same cutting power — the two
algorithms work quite diﬀerently. In general, neither of IECFA and IEWDS
has more bite than the other, as demonstrated by the game G3 of Fig. 3.
It is straightforward to verify that a and b f o rp l a y e r1 ,a n de f o rp l a y e r2
survive IEWDS, while {a} for 1 and {e,f} for 2 survive IECFA and are thus
the fully permissible sets, as shown below:
Ξ(0) = Σ1 × Σ2
Ξ(1) = {{a},{c},{a,b},{a,c},{b,c},{a,b,c}}
×{ { e},{g},{e,f},{e,g},{f,g},{e,f,g}}
Ξ(2) = {{a},{c},{a,b},{a,c},{b,c},{a,b,c}} × {{e},{e,f}}
Ξ(3) = {{a},{a,b} }×{ { e},{e,f}}
Ξ(4) = {{a},{a,b} }×{ { e,f}}
Π = Ξ(5) = {{a}} × {{e,f}}
Strategy b survives IEWDS but does not appear in any fully permissible set.
Strategy f appears in an fully permissible set but does not survive IEWDS.
We refer to Sect. 5 for further comparison between IECFA and IEWDS.
3. States, Types, Preferences, and Belief
In the following two sections we provide an epistemic characterization of
the concept of fully permissible sets. The ﬁrst of these sections
• presents a framework for strategic games where each player is modeled
as a decision maker under uncertainty, and
• introduces the epistemic operators that will be employed in this char-
acterization.
The decision-theoretic analysis builds on Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel
[15]. We relax continuity of preferences to allow the imposition of ‘cau-
tion’, as discussed in the introduction. Moreover, we also relax complete-
ness of preferences to accommodate preferences that can be expressed solely
in terms of admissibility on nested sets, and thus cannot be represented byADMISSIBILITY AND COMMON BELIEF 9
means of subjective probabilities. The framework is summarized by the con-
c e p to fabelief system (cf. Def. 2). Appendix A contains a presentation of
the decision-theoretic terminology, notation and results that will be utilized.
3.1. A Strategic Game Form. Let z : S → Z map strategy vectors into
outcomes, where Z is the set of outcomes. Then ((Si)i∈N,z) is a ﬁnite
strategic two-player game form.
3.2. States and Types. When a strategic game form is turned into a
decision problem for each player (see Tan & Werlang [39]), the uncertainty
faced by a player concerns the strategy choice of his opponent, the belief of
his opponent about his own strategy choice, and so on. A type of a player
corresponds to a vNM utility function and a belief about the strategy choice
of his opponent, a belief about the belief of his opponent about his own
strategy choice, and so on.
Given an assumption of coherency, models of such inﬁnite hierarchies
of beliefs (Armbruster & B¨ oge [2], B¨ oge & Eisele [17], Mertens & Zamir
[33], Brandenburger & Dekel [22], Epstein & Wang [28]) yield S × T as the
complete state space, where S is the underlying space of uncertainty and
where T = T1 × T2 is the set of all feasible type vectors. Furthermore, for
each i, there is a homeomorphism between Ti and the set of beliefs on S×Tj,
where j denotes i’s opponent. Combined with a vNM utility function, the
set of beliefs on S × Tj corresponds to the set of “regular” binary relations
o nt h es e to fa c t so nS × Tj, where an act on S × Tj is a function that to
any element of S × Tj assigns an objective randomization on Z.
F o re a c ht y p eo fa n yp l a y e ri, the type’s decision problem is to choose one
of i’s strategies. For the modeling of this problem, the type’s belief about his
own decision is not relevant and can be ignored. Hence, models of inﬁnite
hierarchies of beliefs — in the setting of a strategic game form — imply that
each type of any player i corresponds to a “regular” binary relation on the
s e to fa c t so nSj × Tj.
In conformity with the literature on inﬁnite hierarchies of beliefs, let
• the set of states of the world (or simply states)b eΩ: =S × T,
• each type ti of any player i correspond to a binary relation  ti on the
set of acts on Sj × Tj.
However, we do not construct a complete state space by explicitly modeling
inﬁnite hierarchies of beliefs. For tractability we instead directly consider
an implicit model — with a ﬁnite type set Ti for each player i —f r o m
which inﬁnite hierarchies of beliefs can be constructed.1 Moreover, since
completeness and continuity of preferences are not imposed, the “regularity”
conditions on  ti consist of reﬂexivity, transitivity, objective independence,
nontriviality, conditional completeness, conditional continuity and non-null
1Thisisnot purely a matter of convenience asBrandenburger [21] and Brandenburger
& Keisler [23] have shown that a complete state space may not exist if beliefs are not
based on subjective probabilities. In contrast to Battigalli & Siniscalchi’s [11] epistemic
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state independence, meaning that  ti is conditionally represented by a vNM
utility function υ
ti
i : Z → R that assigns a payoﬀ to any outcome (cf. Prop.
A1 of Appendix A).2 Being a vNM utility function, υ
ti
i can be extended to
objective randomizations on Z.S i n c e  ti is conditionally represented, it
follows that strong and weak dominance are well-deﬁned. The construction
is summarized by the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2. A belief system for a game form ((Si)i∈N,z) consists of
• for each player i, a ﬁnite set of types Ti,
• for each type ti of any player i, a binary relation  ti (ti’s preferences)
on the set of acts on Sj × Tj , where  ti is conditionally represented
by a vNM utility function υ
ti
i .
3.3. Beliefand Certain Belief . When preferences are not continuous,
one can differentiate between belief and certain belief in a manner that will
be explained below. Both ‘belief’and ‘certain belief’are subjective, as they
are derived from preferences (following the approach of Morris [34]); hence,
neither operator satisﬁes the truth axiom. To state these operators, let, for
each player i and each state ω ∈ Ω, ti(ω) denote the projection of ω on Ti,
and let, for any event E ⊆ Ω, E
ti







j)=( sj,t j)a n dt 
i = ti} denote the set of opponent strategy-type
pairs that are consistent with ω ∈ E and ti(ω)=ti.
It is perhaps easier to introduce these concepts in the case when pref-





L) ∈ L∆(Sj × Tj) (cf. footnote 2). Then an event is ‘certainly
believed’if no element of the complement is assigned positive probability by
some probability distribution in λti:







j := suppλti (⊆ Sj × Tj). On the other hand, an event is ‘believed’
if no element of the complement is assigned positive probability by µ
ti
1 :3









1 (⊆ Sj × Tj). It follows that KiE ⊆ BiE (i.e. ‘certain










2If conditional completeness is strengthened to completeness, then it follows from
Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel [15] that  
ti isrepres ented by υ
ti
i and a lexicographic





L) ∈ L∆(Sj × Tj) (cf. Prop. A2 of Appendix




i and a subjective probability distribution µ
ti ∈ ∆(Sj × Tj). Continuity
is inconsistent with the present analysis due to the requirement of ‘caution’. Complete-
ness, implying a subjective probability representation through an LPS, is consistent with
– though not implied by – the concept of ‘admissible consistency’, but inconsistent with
the concept of ‘full admissible consistency’ (cf. Sect. 4).
3Thisnotion of ‘belief’ in the cas e of complete preferencescorres pondsto Branden-
burger’s[20] ‘ﬁrs t-order knowledge’.ADMISSIBILITY AND COMMON BELIEF 11
To generalize κ
ti
j (and thus KiE) to incomplete preferences, let
κ
ti
j := {(sj,t j) ∈ Sj × Tj|(sj,t j) is not Savage-null acc. to  ti}
denote the set of opponent strategy-type pairs that ti deems possible.4 This
generalizes the case of complete preferences, since in that case suppλti is the
set of opponent strategy-type pairs that ti does not deem Savage-null.
To generalize β
ti
j (and thus BiE) to incomplete preferences, say that  ti
is admissible on βj, where ∅  = βj ⊆ Sj ×Tj,i fx  ti y whenever xβj weakly
dominates yβj.I f ti is admissible on βj, then any (s 
j,t  
j) ∈ βj is deemed
inﬁnitely more likely than any (s  
j,t   
j) ∈ Sj × Tj\βj.S i n c e ( s 
j,t  
j)b e i n g
inﬁnitely more likely than (s  
j,t   
j) implies that (s  
j,t   
j)i snot inﬁnitely more
than (s 
j,t  
j), it follows that β 
j ⊆ β  
j or β 
j ⊇ β  
j whenever  ti is admissible
on both β 
j and β  
j . Since, in addition,  ti is admissible on κ
ti
j , it follows
that there exists a unique smallest (w.r.t. set inclusion) non-empty set on
which  ti is admissible; let this set be denoted β
ti
j :5
 ti is admissible on β
ti
j and βj ⊇ β
ti
j whenever  ti is admissible on βj .
This generalizes the case of complete preferences, since in that case suppµ
ti
1
is the unique smallest set of opponent strategy-type pairs on which  ti
is admissible. Also with incomplete preferences it follows that KiE ⊆ BiE
since  ti is admissible on κ
ti






j  = κ
ti
j , then ti’s preferences
are not continuous.
In addition to KiE ⊆ BiE, it follows that the operators Bi and Ki satisfy
BiE ∩ BiF = Bi(E ∩ F) KiE ∩ KiF = Ki(E ∩ F)
Bi∅ = ∅ KiΩ=Ω
BiE ⊆ KiBiEK iE ⊆ KiKiE
¬BiE ⊆ Ki(¬BiE) ¬KiE ⊆ Ki(¬KiE).
Since KiE ⊆ BiE implies that Ki∅ = ∅, BiΩ=Ω ,BiE ⊆ BiBiE and
¬BiE ⊆ Bi(¬BiE), both operators Bi and Ki correspond to KD45 systems.
Since an event can be certainly believed even though the true state is an
element of the complement of the event, it follows that neither operator
satisﬁes the truth axiom (i.e. KiE ⊆ E and BiE ⊆ E need not hold).





j ). Say that i certainly believes the event E ⊆ Ωg i v e nω if




j ). Write KE := K1E ∩ K2E.S a y
that there is mutual certain belief of E ⊆ Ωg i v e nω if ω ∈ KE.W r i t e
CKE := KE ∩ KKE ∩ KKKE ∩ .... Say that there is common certain
belief of E ⊆ Ωg i v e nω if ω ∈ CKE.
4The term ‘certain belief’ for this notion is also used by Morris [34].
5Thisnotion of ‘belief’ isrelated to, but diﬀersfrom, Morris ’ [34] ‘s trong belief’.12 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND MARTIN DUFWENBERG
3.4. Full Belief. In Sect. 4 the concept of fully permissible sets will be
characterized by imposing common certain belief of the event of ‘full admis-
sible consistency’. The deﬁnition of ‘full admissible consistency’ is based on
an epistemic operator that we will refer to as ‘full belief’. This subsection
introduces and characterizes this operator.
An event is ‘fully believed’if any element of the event that is not Savage-
null is deemed inﬁnitely more likely than any element of the complement:
B0





It follows that B0









j . It follows that KiE ⊆ B0












In addition to KiE ⊆ B0
i E ⊆ BiE, it follows that the operator B0
i satisﬁes
B0
i E ∩ B0
i F ⊆ B0
i (E ∩ F)
B0
i E ⊆ KiB0
i E
¬B0
i E ⊆ Ki(¬B0
i E).
Note that KiE ⊆ B0
i E ⊆ BiE implies that B0





i E and ¬B0
i E ⊆ B0
i (¬B0
i E). However, even though the operator B0
i
satisﬁes B0
i E ⊆¬ B0
i ¬E as well as positive and negative introspection, it
does not satisfy monotonicity since E ⊆ F does not imply B0
i E ⊆ B0
i F.T o
see that the operator B0
i does not satisfy monotonicity, consider G1 of the
introduction: If 2 prefers any strategy that (weakly) dominates another on
{U}, regardless of what happen outside {U}, then it does not follow that
2 prefer any strategy that weakly dominates another on {U,M}, regardless
of what happens outside {U,M}, since weak dominance on {U,M} does
not imply (weak) dominance on {U}. This is illustrated by L and R: ω ∈
B0
2({(s1,s 2,t 1,t 2)|s1 = U})d o e snot imply that t2(ω) prefers L to R, while
ω ∈ B0
2({(s1,s 2,t 1,t 2)|s1 ∈{ U,M}}) does imply that t2(ω) prefers L to R.
Such non-monotonic operators arise also in other contributions that pro-
vide epistemic conditions for forward induction. In particular, Battigalli &
Siniscalchi [11] use a non-monotonic operator which they call ‘strong belief’.
However, in contrast to Battigalli & Siniscalchi’s [11] use of the operator
‘strong belief’, our non-monotonic operator B0
i is used only for deﬁning the
event of ‘full admissible consistency’, while the monotonic operator Ki is
used for the interactive epistemology.
Say that i fully believes the event E ⊆ Ωg i v e nω if ω ∈ B0
i E (or equiva-





3.5. Preferences over Strategies. Let  
ti
Sj denote the marginal of  ti
on Sj. A pure strategy si ∈ Si c a nb ev i e w e da sa na c txSj on Sj that
assigns z(si,s j)t oa n ysj ∈ Sj.A mixed strategy xi ∈ ∆(Si) corresponds
to an act xSj on Sj that assigns z(xi,s j)t oa n ysj ∈ Sj. Hence,  
ti
Sj is a
binary relation also on the subset of acts on Sj that correspond to i’s mixed
strategies. Thus,  
ti
Sj can be referred to as ti’s preferences over i’s mixedADMISSIBILITY AND COMMON BELIEF 13
strategies. The set of mixed strategies ∆(Si) is the set of acts that are at
ti’s actual disposal.
Since  ti is reﬂexive and transitive and satisﬁes objective independence,
 
ti
Sj shares these properties, and ti’s choice set,
C
ti
i := {si ∈ Si|si is maximal w.r.t.  
ti
Sj in ∆(Si)},
is non-empty and supports any maximal mixed strategy.
3.6. Playing the Game. The event that i plays the game G =( Si,u i)i∈N
is given by
[ui]: ={ω ∈ Ω|υ
ti(ω)
i ◦ z is a positive aﬃne transformation of ui},
while [u1] ∩ [u2] is the event that both players play G.
4. Consistency of Preferences
Usually requirements in deductive game theory are imposed on choice.
E.g. rationality is a requirement on a pair (si,t i), where si is said to be a
‘rational choice’by ti if si ∈ C
ti
i , and where the event that i is rational is
deﬁned as6
[rati]: ={(s1,s 2,t 1,t 2) ∈ Ω|si ∈ C
ti
i }.
The present paper imposes requirements on ti only. Since ti corresponds
to the preferences  ti, such requirements will be imposed on  ti. In sup-
port of this alternative approach — which will be referred to by the term
‘consistent preferences’— one can note the following: The approach allows
• ... requirements to be imposed on types rather than strategy-type
pairs.
• ... conventional concepts like rationalizable and permissible strategies
to be characterized under weak and natural conditions (see e.g. Prop.
3 and Remark 1 below).
• ... requirements like ‘caution’and ‘full belief of opponent rationality’
to be imposed in a straightforward manner. Under the usual approach,
the notion of ‘certain belief’must be weakened to accommodate cau-
tion (cf. B¨ orgers ([18], pp. 266–267) and Epstein ([27], p. 3)), and
a non-monotonic epistemic operator must be used for the interactive
epistemology to accommodate full belief of opponent rationality.
Here we will focus on showing how ‘consistent preferences’as an approach
to deductive game-theoretic analysis can be used to provide an epistemic
characterization for the algorithm presented in Sect. 2 and, thus, to provide
epistemic conditions for aspects of forward induction. In particular, we will
1. ... characterize the concept of permissible strategies through imposing
common certain belief of ‘admissible consistency’. This exercise has
separate interest since it diﬀers from the results of B¨ orgers [18] and
Brandenburger [20] by providing an epistemic foundation for the DF
6See e.g. Epstein ([27], Sect. 6) for a presentation of this approach in a general context.14 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND MARTIN DUFWENBERG
procedure by means of an operator (certain belief) that need not be
weakened to allow the complement of a believed event to be taken into
account.
2. ... argue for the alternative and stronger requirement of ‘full admissible
consistency’, and characterize the main concept of this paper – fully
permissible sets – by imposing common certain belief of ‘full admissible
consistency’.
4.1. Admissible Consistency. Below we characterize the concept of per-
missible strategies in a ﬁnite strategic game G =( Si,u i)i∈N by imposing
three requirements: The ﬁrst of these ensures that each player plays the
game G, the second requirement ensures that each player takes all opponent
strategies into account (‘caution’), while the third requirement ensures that
each player believes that the opponent chooses rationally (‘belief of oppo-
nent rationality’). The ﬁrst requirement is stated in subsect. 3.6. To impose
the other two, consider the following events
[caui]: ={ω ∈ Ω|κ
ti(ω)










j denotes the set of opponent types that ti deems pos-
sible, and where [ratj]j := projSj×Tj[ratj]={(sj,t j)|sj ∈ C
tj
j }.7
• If ω ∈ [caui], then (sj,t j) is deemed possible according to  ti(ω) when-
ever tj is deemed possible. This means that, ∀(sj,t j) ∈ Sj × T
ti(ω)
j ,




2) ∈ Ω|(s 
j,t  
j)  =( sj,t j)} (cf. Dekel & Gul’s [25]
deﬁnition of caution). It implies that the marginal of  ti(ω) on Sj (i.e.,
ti(ω)’s preferences over Si,  
ti(ω)
Sj ) is admissible on Sj.
• If ω ∈ Bi[ratj], then i believes given ω that j is rational.
Say that i is admissibly consistent (with the game G and the preferences of
his opponent) given ω if ω ∈ Ai, where
Ai := [ui] ∩ [caui] ∩ Bi[ratj].
Refer to A := A1 ∩ A2 as the event of admissible consistency. We can now
characterize the concept of permissible strategies as maximal strategies in
states where there is common certain belief of admissible consistency.
Proposition 3. A pure strategy pi for i is permissible in a ﬁnite strategic




Remark 1. The concept of rationalizable strategies in 2-player games can be
characterized by removing the requirement of ‘caution’: A pure strategy ri
7If ω ∈ [caui]∩Bi[ratj]a n d 
ti(ω) iscomplete, then  
ti(ω) c a nb er e p r e se n t e db y υ
ti(ω)
i





L ) ∈ L∆(Sj ×Tj) satisfying suppλ





1 (rj,t j) > 0o n l yi frj ∈ C
tj
j . Note that ω ∈ [caui] ∩ Bi[ratj]d o e sn o ti m p l y—
but is consistent with —  
ti(ω) being complete, while ω ∈ [caui]∩Bi[ratj]i snot consistent
with  
ti(ω) being continuous.ADMISSIBILITY AND COMMON BELIEF 15
for i is rationalizable in a ﬁnite strategic game G if and only if there exists
a belief system with ri ∈ C
ti(ω)
i for some ω ∈ CK([u1] ∩ B1[rat2] ∩ [u2] ∩
B2[rat1]).
Remark 2. It turns out that Prop. 3 holds even if the additional requirement
of minimal completeness is imposed. In fact, the proof in Appendix B applies
for the following result: A pure strategy pi for i is permissible in a ﬁnite
strategic game G if and only if there exists a belief system with pi ∈ C
ti(ω)
i
for some ω ∈ CK ¯ A, where ¯ A := ¯ A1 ∩ ¯ A2, and where, for each i,
¯ Ai := [ui] ∩{ ω ∈ Ω|x  ti(ω) y if and only if xβj weakly dom. yβj
for βj = β
ti(ω)
j ⊆ [ratj]j or βj = κ
ti(ω)
j = Sj × T
ti(ω)
j }.
Hence, imposing minimal completeness does not alone yield a reﬁnement.
4.2. Full Admissible Consistency. We propose that it is natural to sub-
stitute the requirement ‘full belief of opponent rationality’for ‘belief of op-
ponent rationality’. Therefore, consider the following events.
[caui]: ={ω ∈ Ω|κ
ti(ω)




i [ratj]={ω ∈ Ω| ti(ω) is admissible on [ratj]j ∩ κ
ti(ω)
j }.
If ω ∈ B0
i [ratj], then i fully believes given ω that j is rational. This means
that any (s 
j,t  
j) which is deemed possible and where s 
j is a rational choice
by t 
j is considered inﬁnitely more likely than any (s  
j,t   
j) where s  
j is not a
rational choice by t  
j.W r i t eA0 := A0
1 ∩ A0
2, where for each i,
A0
i := [ui] ∩ [caui] ∩ B0
i [ratj].
Note that A0 ⊆ A since, for each i, B0
i [ratj] ⊆ Bi[ratj].
To motivate the strengthening of ‘belief of opponent rationality’to ‘full
belief of opponent rationality’(and, thus, of A to A0), return to G1 of the
introduction. In this game, {U,M} is the choice set of any type of player
1 (provided that ω ∈ [u1] ∩ [cau1]). While ‘belief of opponent rationality’
is consistent with (some type of) player 2 not deeming M more likely than
the remaining non-maximal strategy D and, thus, not preferring L to R,
‘full belief of opponent rationality’ensures that M is deemed inﬁnitely more
likely than D. Hence, if ω ∈ CKA0,o n l yL is a maximal strategy for t2(ω).
However, common certain belief of the event A0 is not suﬃcient to pro-
mote the forward induction outcome in G2 of Sect. 2. To see this, consider
a belief system with only one type of each player; i.e., T1×T2 = {t1}×{t2}.
Let, for each i,  
ti
i satisfy that υ
ti
i ◦z = ui.L e tt1 deem (R,t2) inﬁnitely more
likely than (L,t2), with (L,t2) not being Savage-null. Then C
t1
1 = {U}.L e t
t2 deem (U,t1) inﬁnitely more likely than (D,t1)a n d( D,t1) inﬁnitely more
likely than (M,t1), with (M,t1) not being Savage-null. Then C
t2
2 = {R}.
Inspection will verify that CKA0 = A0 =Ω=S×T1×T2. Hence, strength-
ening A to A0 is not suﬃcient to promote the forward induction outcome
(M,L) in this game. In fact, we have the following general result.16 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND MARTIN DUFWENBERG
Proposition 4. If (x1,x 2) ∈ ∆(S1) × ∆(S2) is a proper equilibrium in a
ﬁnite strategic game G, then, for each i and any si ∈ suppxi, there exists a
belief system with si ∈ C
ti(ω)
i for some ω ∈ CKA0.
Note that (U,R) is a proper equilibrium in G2. However, the preferences of t2
in the belief system for G2 above are not minimally complete in the sense of
being characterized by ‘caution’and ‘full belief of opponent rationality’ . In
particular, t2 deems one of t1’s non-maximal strategies, D, inﬁnitely more
likely than the another non-maximal strategy, M. It turns out that the
additional imposition of minimal completeness leads to a characterization
of the concept of fully permissible sets, and, hence, to the promotion of the
forward induction outcome in G2 (cf. the analysis of G2 in Sects. 2 and 5).
To impose minimal completeness, consider for each i,
¯ A0
i := [ui] ∩{ ω ∈ Ω|x  ti(ω) y if and only if xβj weakly dom. yβj
for βj = β
ti(ω)
j =[ ratj]j ∩ κ
ti(ω)
j or βj = κ
ti(ω)
j = Sj × T
ti(ω)
j },
where it follows that ¯ A0
i ⊆ [ui] ∩ [caui] ∩ B0
i [ratj]=A0
i. Say that i is fully
admissibly consistent (with the game G and the preferences of his opponent)
given ω if ω ∈ ¯ A0
i, and refer to ¯ A0 := ¯ A0
1 ∩ ¯ A0
2 as the event of full admissible
consistency. We can now characterize the main concept of the present paper
– fully permissible sets – as choice sets in states where there is common
certain belief of full admissible consistency.
Proposition 5. A non-empty strategy set πi for i is fully permissible in
a ﬁnite strategic game G if and only if there exists a belief system with
πi = C
ti(ω)
i for some ω ∈ CK ¯ A0.
Remark 3. Since Prop. 3 holds even if the additional requirement of mini-
mal completeness is imposed (cf. Remark 2), it follows from Prop. 5 that
the reﬁnement relative to permissible strategies – oﬀered by the concept of
fully permissible sets – is eﬀectively due to strengthening of the requirement
of β
ti(ω)
j ⊆ [ratj]j ∩ κ
ti(ω)
j to the requirement of β
ti(ω)




The present section illustrates the concept of fully permissible sets by
returning to the previously discussed game G2 as well as by considering two
new examples. Of the three examples, the two ﬁrst will be used to show how
our concept captures aspects of forward induction, while the last example
will illustrate the possibility of multiple fully permissible sets.
All three examples will be used to shed light on the diﬀerences between
the approach suggested here and IEWDS (where at each round all weakly
dominated strategies are eliminated). This comparative discussion will be
facilitated if we can refer to a characterization of IEWDS established by
Stahl [38]: Assume that each player, for each round g, deems any opponent
strategy not yet eliminated by round g inﬁnitely more likely that any elim-
inated strategy. Hence, the player’s belief will have a hierarchical structureADMISSIBILITY AND COMMON BELIEF 17





3, 1 3, 1 0, 0 0, 0
0, 0 0, 0 1, 3 1, 3
2, 1 -1, 0 2, 1 -1, 0
-1, 0 0, 3 -1, 0 0, 3
Figure 4. Burning money (G4)
if opponent strategies are eliminated through several rounds. Then a strat-
egy survives IEWDS if and only if it is maximal w.r.t. preferences that are
compatible with these hierarchical beliefs.8
5.1. Forward Induction. Reconsider G2 of Sect. 2, and apply our al-
gorithm IECFA to this ‘Battle-of-the-sexes-with-an-outside-option’game.
Since D is a strongly dominated strategy, D cannot be an element of 1’s
choice set. This does not imply, as in the procedure of IEWDS (given Stahl’s
[38] characterization), that 2 deems M inﬁnitely more likely than D.H o w -
ever, 2 certainly believes that only {U}, {M} and {U,M} are candidates for
1’s choice set. This excludes {R} as 2’s choice set, since {R} is 2’s choice set
only if 2 deems {D} or {U,D} possible. This in turn means that 1 certainly
believes that only {L} and {L,R} are candidates for 2’s choice set, imply-
ing that {U} cannot be 1’s choice set. Certainly believing that only {M}
and {U,M} are candidates for 1’s choice set does imply that 2 deems M
inﬁnitely more likely than D. Hence, 2’s choice set is {L} and, therefore, 1’s
choice set {M}. Thus, the forward induction outcome (M,L) is promoted.
Turn now to the ‘Burning money’game due to van Damme ([40], Fig. 5)
and Ben-Porath & Dekel ([13], Fig. 1.2). G4 of Fig. 4 is the pure strategy
reduced strategic form of a ‘Battle-of-the-sexes’(B-o-s) game with the ad-
ditional feature that 1 can publicly destroy 1 unit of payoﬀ before the B-o-s
game starts. BU (NU) is the strategy where 1 burns (does not burn), and
then plays U, etc., while LR is the strategy where 2 responds with L condi-
tional on 1 not burning and R conditional on 1 burning, etc. The forward
induction outcome (supported e.g. by IEWDS) involves implementation of
1’s preferred B-o-s outcome, with no payoﬀ being burnt.
One might be skeptical to the use of IEWDS in the ‘Burning money’
game, because it eﬀectively requires 2 to infer that BU is inﬁnitely more
likely than BD based on the sole premise that BD is eliminated before BU,
even though all strategies involving burning (i.e. both BU and BD)a r e
eventually eliminated by the procedure. On the basis of this premise such
an inference seems at best to be questionable. As shown in Table 1, the
application of our algorithm IECFA yields an iteration where at no stage
8Battigalli [9] establishes a related result. See also Rajan [36]. Brandenburger’s [20]
analysis implies that the DF procedure can be characterized by assuming that each player,
for each round g,d e e m ssome opponent strategy not yet eliminated by round g inﬁnitely
more likely that any eliminated strategy.18 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND MARTIN DUFWENBERG
Ξ(0) = Σ1 × Σ2







Ξ(5) = {{NU},{BU},{NU,BU}} × {{LL},{RL},{LL,RL},{LL,RL}}
Ξ(6) = {{NU},{BU},{NU,BU}} × {{LL},{LL,LR},{LL,RL}}
Ξ(7) = {{NU},{NU,BU}} × {{LL},{LL,LR},{LL,RL}}
Ξ(8) = {{NU},{NU,BU}} × {{LL},{LL,LR}}
Ξ(9) = {{NU}} × {{LL},{LL,LR}}
Π = Ξ(10) = {{NU}} × {{LL,LR}}





1, 1 1, 1
0, 1 2, 0
1, 0 0, 1
Figure 5. Game with multiple fully permissible sets (G5).
need 2 deem BU inﬁnitely more likely than BD since {NU} is always in-
cluded as a candidate for 1’s choice set. The procedure uniquely determines
{NU} as 1’s fully permissible set and {LL,LR} as 2’s fully permissible set.9
Even though the forward induction outcome is obtained, 2 does not have any
assessment concerning the relative likelihood of opponent strategies condi-
tional on burning; hence, she need not interpret burning as a signal that 1
will play according with his preferred B-o-s outcome.
We can conclude that the concept of fully permissible sets yields the for-
ward induction outcome in G2 and G4. Furthermore, the concept promotes
forward induction for diﬀerent reasons than does the procedure of IEWDS
(and the concept of EFR, which works like IEWDS in these games).
5.2. Multiple Fully Permissible Sets. In G5 of Fig. 5, IEWDS elimi-
nates D in the ﬁrst round, R in the second round, and M in the third round,
so that U and L survive. Stahl’s [38] characterization of IEWDS entails that
2 deems each of U and M inﬁnitely more likely than D. Hence, the proce-
dure forces 2 to deem M inﬁnitely more likely than D for the sole reason
9Also Battigalli [8], Asheim [3], and Dufwenberg [26] (as well as Hurkens [31] in a
slightly diﬀerent context) argue that (NU,LR) in addition to (NU,LL) isa viable s trategy
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that D is eliminated before M, even though both M and D are eventually
eliminated by the procedure.
Turn now to IECFA, which yields:
Ξ(0) = Σ1 × Σ2
Ξ(1) = {{U},{M},{U,M}} × Σ2
Ξ(2) = {{U},{M},{U,M} }×{ { L},{L,R}}
Π = Ξ(3) = {{U},{U,M} }×{ { L},{L,R}}
Since D is a weakly dominated strategy, D cannot be an element of 1’s
choice set. Hence, 2 certainly believes that only {U}, {M} and {U,M}
are candidates for 1’s choice set. This excludes {R} as 2’s choice set, since
{R} is 2’s choice set only if 2 deems {D} or {U,D} possible. This in turn
means that 1 certainly believes that only {L} and {L,R} are candidates
for 2’s choice set, implying that {M} cannot be 1’s choice set. There is no
further elimination. This means that 1’s collection of fully permissible sets is
{{U},{U,M}} and 2’s collection of fully permissible sets is {{L},{L,R}}.
Thus, common certain belief of full admissible consistency implies that 2
deems U inﬁnitely more likely than D since U (respectively, D)i sa ne l e m e n t
of any (respectively, no) fully permissible set for 1. However, whether 2
deems M inﬁnitely more likely than D depends on the type of player 2.
Note that in G5 there cannot be mutual certain belief of the players’choice
sets. E.g. if 1’s choice set is {U}, it is because 1 certainly believes that 2’s
choice set is {L}. However, {L} is 2’s choice set only if 2 does not certainly
believe that 1’s choice set is {U}. Likewise, if 1’s choice set is {U,M}.
Multiplicity of fully permissible sets arises also in the strategic form of
some well-known extensive games in which the application of backward in-
duction has been subject to debate, e.g. the ‘Centipede’game. See Asheim
& Dufwenberg [6] for more on this.
6. Concluding remarks
We end by discussing related literature as well as commenting on the
scope of the general approach chosen in the present paper.
6.1. Related Literature. It is instructive to explain how our analysis dif-
fers from the epistemic foundation of EFR provided by Battigalli & Sinis-
calchi [11]. An analogous comparison can be made to contributions that
provide epistemic conditions for IEWDS, see e.g. Rajan [36] and Stahl [38].
It turns out to be of minor importance for the comparison to EFR that EFR
makes use of the extensive form, while the present analysis is performed in
the strategic form. The reason is that, by ‘caution’, a rational choice in the
whole game implies a rational choice in all subgames that are not precluded
from being reached by the player’s own strategy.
To capture forward induction players must essentially deem any opponent
strategy that is a rational choice inﬁnitely more likely than any opponent
strategy not having this property. An analysis incorporating this feature20 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND MARTIN DUFWENBERG
must involve a non-monotonic epistemic operator, which is called ‘full belief’
in the present analysis (cf. subsect. 3.4) and ‘strong belief’by Battigalli
& Siniscalchi ([11], Sect. 4). Here, ‘full belief’is used only to deﬁne the
event that the preferences of each player is ‘fully admissibly consistent’with
the preferences of his opponent. A standard monotonic epistemic operator
(‘certain belief’) is, however, used for the interactive epistemology:
• each player certainly believes that the preferences of his opponent are
fully admissibly consistent,
• each player certainly believes that his opponent certainly believes that
he himself has preferences that are fully admissibly consistent, etc. ...
In contrast, Battigalli & Siniscalchi [11] use the non-monotonic operator
‘strong belief’for the interactive epistemology, implying that an auxiliary op-
erator (called ‘correct strong belief’) must be introduced for deﬁning higher-
order beliefs.
The fact that a non-monotonic epistemic operator is involved when cap-
turing forward induction also means that the analysis must ensure that all
rational choices for the opponent are included in the epistemic model. Batti-
galli & Siniscalchi [11] ensure this by employing a complete epistemic model,
where all possible epistemic types for each player are represented. Instead,
the present analysis achieves this by imposing that the preferences of the
players are characterized by ‘caution’and ‘full belief of opponent rational-
ity’, meaning that the preferences are minimally complete (cf. subsect. 4.2).
Since an ordinary monotonic operator is used for the interactive epistemol-
ogy, there is no more need for a complete epistemic model here, than in
usual epistemic analyses of rationalizability and permissibility.
Battigalli [9] has shown how EFR corresponds to the ‘best rationalization
principle’. This implies that some opponent strategies are neither completely
rational nor completely irrational, but are considered to be at immediate de-
grees of rationality. Likewise, Stahl [38] provides an interpretation of IEWDS
where strategies eliminated in the ﬁrst round are completely irrational, while
strategies eliminated in later rounds are at immediate degrees of rational-
ity. The present analysis, in contrast, diﬀerentiates only between whether a
strategy is maximal (i.e. a rational choice) or not. In particular, although a
strategy that is weakly dominated on the set of all opponent strategies is a
“stupid” choice, it need not be more “stupid” than any remaining admissible
strategy, as this depends on the interactive analysis of the game. This point
has been illustrated by the examples of Sect. 5.
Our paper has a predecessor in Samuelson [37], who also presents an
epistemic analysis of admissibility that leads to a collection of sets for each
player, called a ‘generalized consistent pair’. Samuelson [37] requires that
a player’s choice set equals the set of strategies that are not weakly dom-
inated on the union of choice sets that are deemed possible for the oppo-
nent; this corresponds to our requirement ‘full belief of opponent rational-
ity’. However, since ‘caution’ is not imposed, his analysis does not yieldADMISSIBILITY AND COMMON BELIEF 21
{{U,M}} × {{L}} in our illustrative example (G1). Furthermore, he im-
poses additional requirements (cf. his conditions (44) and (45)) that are
incompatible with general existence. If each player is certain about the
choice set of the opponent, one obtains a ‘consistent pair’(cf. B¨orgers &
Samuelson [19]), a concept that need not exist even when a generalized con-
sistent pair exists. Ewerhart [29] modiﬁes the concept of a consistent pair
by adding ‘caution’. However, since he removes minimal completeness to
ensure general existence, his concept of a ‘modiﬁed consistent pair’does not
promote forward induction in G2.
Note that ‘caution’and ‘full belief of opponent rationality’are require-
ments on the preferences (or beliefs) of players. Since minimal completeness
is imposed by having preferences be characterized by ‘caution’and ‘full be-
lief of opponent rationality’, preferences need not be complete and cannot
be represented by means of subjective probabilities (except through treat-
ing incomplete preferences as a set of complete preferences; cf. Aumann
[7]). By not employing subjective probabilities, the analysis is related to
the ﬁlter model of belief presented by Brandenburger [21]. By imposing re-
quirements on the preferences of players rather than their choice, our paper
follows a tradition in equilibrium analysis where concepts are characterized
as equilibria in conjectures (cf. Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel [16]).10
6.2. General Approach. Through an approach where requirements are
imposed on the consistency of each player’s preferences with the preferences
of his opponent – the ‘consistent preferences’approach – we have character-
ized a fully permissible set as a choice set under common certain belief of
full admissible consistency. We have thus provided an epistemic foundation
for aspects of forward induction. The concept of full admissible consistency
entails that types ‘fully believe’that opponents choose rationally. The sepa-
ration of ‘full belief’of the rationality of opponent choice from ‘certain belief’
of the full admissible consistency of opponent types, which the ‘consistent
preferences’approach allows, means that the non-monotonic operator ‘full
belief’need not be used for the interactive epistemology.
The ‘consistent preferences’approach has wider application; e.g., it can
characterize rationalizability and permissibility as noted by Prop. 3 and
Remark 1 of the present paper. Moreover, it is shown elsewhere how this
approach may enhance our understanding of the epistemic conditions un-
derlying backward induction by separating requirements on the assessment
of opponent choice from ‘certain belief’of the consistency of opponent types
(cf. Asheim [4, 5]). Hence, the ‘consistent preferences’approach is not an
idiosyncratic approach exclusively designed for the characterization of the
concept of fully permissible sets. Rather, it is an approach that follows natu-
rally from the modeling of players as decision makers under uncertainty and
which appears to have general interest for deductive game-theoretic analysis.
10In deductive game-theoretic analys isthis— together with the requirement that pref-
erencesare minimally complete — isrelated to a property called ‘coherence’ by Gul [30].22 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND MARTIN DUFWENBERG
Appendix A. The Decision-Theoretic Framework
The purpose of this appendix is to present the decision-theoretic terminology,
notation and results utilized and referred to in the main text.
Consider a decision maker under uncertainty. Let F be a ﬁnite set of states,
where the decision maker is uncertain about what state in F will be realized. Let Z
be a ﬁnite set of outcomes. In the tradition of Anscombe & Aumann [1], the decision
maker is endowed with a binary relation over all functions that to each element of
F assigns an objective randomization on Z. Any such function xF : F → ∆(Z)i s
called an act on F. Write xF and yF f o ra c t so nF.Areﬂexive and transitive binary
relation on the set of acts on F is denoted by  F, where xF  F yF means that xF
is preferred or indiﬀerent to yF. As usual, let  F (preferred to)a n d∼F (indiﬀerent
to) denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of  F. A binary relation  F on
the set of acts on F is said to satisfy
• objective independence if x 
F  F (respectively ∼F) x  
F iﬀ γx 
F +(1−γ)yF  F
(respectively ∼F) γx  
F +(1−γ)yF, whenever 0 <γ<1a n dyF is arbitrary.
• nontriviality if there exist xF and yF such that xF  F yF.
• continuity if there exist 0 <γ<δ<1 such that δx 
F +( 1− δ)x  
F  F yF  F
γx 
F +( 1− γ)x  
F whenever x 
F  F yF  F x  
F.
If E ⊆ F,l e txE denote the restriction of xF to E. Deﬁne the conditional binary
relation  E by x 
F  E x  
F if, for arbitrary yF,( x 
E,y−E)  F (x  
E,y−E), where −E
denotes F\E. Say that the state f ∈ F is Savage-null if xF ∼{f} yF for all acts
xF and yF on F. A binary relation  F is said to satisfy
• conditional completeness if, ∀f ∈ F,  {f} is complete.
• conditional continuity if, ∀f ∈ F, there exist 0 <γ<δ<1 such that
δx 
F+(1−δ)x  
F  {f} yF  {f} γx 
F+(1−γ)x  
F whenever x 
F  {f} yF  {f} x  
F.
• non-null state independence if xF  {e} yF iﬀ xF  {f} yF whenever e and f
are not Savage-null and xF and yF satisfy xF(e)=xF(f)a n dyF(e)=yF(f).
If e, f ∈ F and  F is conditionally complete, then e is deemed inﬁnitely more likely
than f (e   f)i fe is not Savage-null and xF  {e} yF implies (x−{f},x 
{f})  {e,f}
(y−{f},y 
{f}) for all x 
F, y 
F. According to this deﬁnition, f may, but need not, be
Savage-null if e   f. Say that yF is maximal w.r.t.  E if there is no xF such that
xF  E yF.
If υ : Z → R is a vNM utility function, abuse notation slightly by writing
υ(x)=

z∈Z x(z)υ(z) whenever x ∈ ∆(Z) is an objective randomization. Say that
xE strongly dominates yE w.r.t. υ if, ∀f ∈ E, υ(xE(f)) >υ (yE(f)). Say that
xE weakly dominates yE w.r.t. υ if, ∀f ∈ E, υ(xE(f)) ≥ υ(yE(f)), with strict
inequality for some e ∈ E. Say that  F is admissible on E ( = ∅)i fxF  F yF
whenever xE weakly dominates yE.
The following two representation results can now be stated. The ﬁrst one —
which follows directly from the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem on expected
utility representation — requires the notion of conditional representation: Say that
 F is conditionally represented by υ if (a)  F is nontrivial and (b) xF  {f} yF iﬀ
υ(xF(f)) ≥ υ(yF(f)) whenever f is not Savage-null.
Proposition A1. If  F is reﬂexive and transitive, and satisﬁes objective indepen-
dence, nontriviality, conditional completeness, conditional continuity, and non-null
state independence, then there exists a vNM utility function υ : Z → R such that
 F is conditionally represented by υ.ADMISSIBILITY AND COMMON BELIEF 23
The second result, due to Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel ([15], Theorem 3.1),
requires the notion of a lexicographic probability system (LPS) which consists of
L levels of subjective probability distributions: If L ≥ 1 and, ∀  ∈{ 1,...,L},
µ  ∈ ∆(F), then λ =( µ1,...,µL)i sa nL P So nF.L e t L∆(F) denote the set of
LPSs on F, and let, for two utility vectors v and w, v ≥L w denote that, whenever
w  >v  , there exists    < such that v  >w  .
Proposition A2. If  F is complete and transitive, and satisﬁes objective indepen-
dence, nontriviality, conditional continuity, and non-null state independence, then
there exists a vNM utility function υ : Z → R and an LPS λ =( µ1,...,µL) ∈ L∆(F)











If F = F1 × F2 and  F is a binary relation on the set of acts on F, then say
that  F1 is the marginal of  F on F1 if, xF1  F1 yF1 iﬀ xF  F yF whenever
xF1(f1)=xF(f1,f 2)a n dyF1(f1)=yF(f1,f 2) for all (f1,f 2).
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that if ∅  =Ξ  
j ⊆ Ξ  
j ⊆ Σj, then ∅  = αi(Ξ 
j) ⊆
αi(Ξ  
j) ⊆ αi(Σj). Repetitive use of this result implies that, ∀g ≥ 1, (∅  =) Ξ(g) ⊆
Ξ(g − 1) (⊆ Σ). From this monotonicity and the ﬁniteness of Σ, it follows that
Ξ(g) converges in a ﬁnite number of iterations to Π with (∅  =) Π = α(Π) (⊆ Σ).
This establishes parts (i) and (ii). Let ˜ Π denote the smallest rectangular collec-
tion that includes all Ξ satisfying Ξ ⊆ α(Ξ). There exists a collection Ξ satisfying
Ξ ⊆ α(Ξ) since Π ⊆ α(Π); hence, Π ⊆ ˜ Π. If Ξ ⊆ α(Ξ), then Ξ ⊆ α(Ξ) ⊆ α(˜ Π)
since, ∀i ∈ N, αi is monotone. Hence, ˜ Π ⊆ α(˜ Π) since α(˜ Π) is rectangular. As
(∅  =) Π ⊆ ˜ Π ⊆ α(˜ Π) ⊆ α(Ξ(0)) = Ξ(1) (⊆ Σ), repetitive use of the monotonicity
result implies that, ∀g ≥ 1, (∅  =) Π ⊆ ˜ Π ⊆ α(˜ Π) ⊆ α(Ξ(g−1)) = Ξ(g)( ⊆ Σ). Since
Ξ(g) converges to Π, it follows that (∅  =) Π = ˜ Π=α(˜ Π) (⊆ Σ). This establishes
part (iii).
To prove Prop. 2, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne the concept of permissible strategies.
For any (∅  =) X = X1 × X2 ⊆ S, write ˜ a(X): =˜ a1(X2) × ˜ a2(X1), where
˜ ai(Xj): =Si \{ si ∈ Si|∃xi ∈ ∆(Si) s.t. xi strongly dom. si on Xj
or xi weakly dom. si on Sj}.
Deﬁnition B1. Consider the sequence deﬁned by X(0) = S and, ∀g ≥ 1, X(g)=
˜ a(X(g − 1)). A pure strategy pi is said to be permissible if pi ∈
∞
g=0 Xi(g).
Let P = P1 ×P2 denote the set of permissible strategy vectors. To characterize P,
write for any (∅  =) X = X1 × X2 ⊆ S, a(X): =a1(X2) × a2(X1), where
ai(Xj): ={pi ∈ Si|∃(∅  =)Qj ⊆ Xj s.t. pi ∈ Si\Di(Qj)}.
Lemma B1. For any (∅  =) Xj ⊆ Sj, ai(Xj)=˜ ai(Xj).
Proof. Part 1: ai(Xj) ⊆ ˜ ai(Xj). If si / ∈ ˜ ai(Xj), then ∃xi ∈ ∆(Si) s.t. xi strongly
dominates si on Xj or xi weakly dominates si on Sj. From this it follows that
∀(∅  =) Qj ⊆ Xj, ∃xi ∈ ∆(Si) s.t. xi weakly dominates si on Qj or Sj, implying
that ∀(∅  =) Qj ⊆ Xj, si ∈ Di(Qj). This means that si / ∈ ai(Xj).24 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND MARTIN DUFWENBERG
Part 2: ai(Xj) ⊇ ˜ ai(Xj). If si ∈ ˜ ai(Xj), then there does not exist xi ∈ ∆(Si)
s.t. xi strongly dominates si on Xj or xi weakly dominates si on Sj. Hence,
by Pearce ([35], Lemmas 2 and 4), there exists an LPS λ =( µ1,µ 2) ∈ L∆(Sj)
with suppµ1 ⊆ Xj and suppµ2 = Sj such that si is maximal in ∆(Si) w.r.t. the
preferences represented by the vNM utility function ui and the LPS λ (cf. Prop.
A2). However, then there does not exist xi ∈ ∆(Si) s.t. xi weakly dominates si on
suppµ1 (⊆ Xj) or suppµ2 (= Sj), implying that si / ∈ Di(Qj)f o rQj = suppµ1 ⊆
Xj. This means that si ∈ ai(Xj).
The following proposition is a straightforward implication of Lemma B1.
Proposition B1. (i) The sequence deﬁned by X(0) = S and, ∀g ≥ 1, X(g)=
a(X(g − 1)) converges to P in a ﬁnite number of iterations. (ii) ∀i ∈ N, Pi  = ∅.
(iii) P = a(P).( i v )∀i ∈ N, pi ∈ Pi if and only if there exists X = X1 × X2 with
pi ∈ Xi such that X ⊆ a(X).
Proof of Proposition 2. Using Prop. 1(ii), the deﬁnitions of α(·)a n da(·) imply
that, ∀i ∈ N, P0
i := ∪σi∈Πiσi = ∪σi∈αi(Πi)σi ⊆ ai(P0
i ). Since P0 ⊆ a(P0) implies
P0 ⊆ P (by Prop. B1(iv)), it follows that, ∀i ∈ N, ∪σi∈Πiσi ⊆ Pi.
For the proofs of Propositions 3 and 5, we ﬁrst need to establish some properties
of the operator ‘certain belief’(cf. subsect. 3.3). Write K0E := E and, for each
g ≥ 1, KgE := KKg−1E. Since Ki(E ∩ F)=KiE ∩ KiF, and since Ki∅ = ∅,
conjunction, and positive and negative introspection imply that KiKiE = KiE,i t
follows ∀g ≥ 2, KgE = K1Kg−1E ∩ K2Kg−1E ⊆ K1K1Kg−2E ∩ K2K2Kg−2E =
K1Kg−2E ∩K2Kg−2E = Kg−1E. Even though the truth axiom (KiE ⊆ E)i sn o t
satisﬁed, the present paper considers certain belief only of events (like E := E1∩E2
where, for each i, Ei = {ω ∈ Ω|ti(ω) ∈ T 
i}) that concerns the type vector. Mutual
certain belief of any such event E implies that E is true: KE = K1E ∩ K2E ⊆
K1E1 ∩ K2E2 = E1 ∩ E2 = E since, for each i, KiEi = Ei. Hence, (i) ∀g ≥ 1,
KgE ⊆ Kg−1E,a n d(ii) ∃g  ≥ 0 such that KgE = CKE for g ≥ g  since Ω is
ﬁnite, implying that CKE = KCKE.
Proof of Proposition 3. Part 1: If pi is permissible, then there exists a belief system
with pi ∈ C
ti(ω)
i for some ω ∈ CKA. It is suﬃcient to show that one can construct
a belief system with A =Ω=S × T1 × T2 such that, ∀i ∈ N, ∀pi ∈ Pi, there
exists ti ∈ Ti with pi ∈ C
ti
i . Construct a belief system with, ∀i ∈ N, a one-
to-one mapping si : Ti → Pi from the set of types to the the set of permissible
strategies. From Prop. B1(iii) it follows that, ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti ∈ Ti, ∃Q
ti
j ⊆ Pi
such that si(ti) ∈ Si\Di(Q
ti
j ). Determine the set of opponent types that ti does
not deem Savage-null as follows: T
ti
j = {tj ∈ Tj|sj(tj) ∈ Q
ti
j }.L e t  ti satisfy
that υ
ti
i ◦ z = ui and that x ti y iﬀ xβj weakly dominates yβj for βj = β
ti
j =
{(sj,t j)|sj = sj(tj)a n dtj ∈ T
ti
j } or βj = κ
ti
j = Sj ×T
ti
j . This means that, ∀i ∈ N,




j )   si(ti) since xSj  
ti
Sj ySj iﬀ xQj weakly dominates yQj
for Qj = Q
ti
j or Qj = Sj, implying that, ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti ∈ Ti, β
ti
j ⊆ [ratj]j. Hence,
S × T1 × T2 =[ u1] ∩ [cau1] ∩ B1[rat2] ∩ [u2] ∩ [cau2] ∩ B2[rat1]=A.
Part 2: If there exists a belief system with pi ∈ C
ti(ω)
i for some ω ∈ CKA, then
pi is permissible. In view of Def. B1 and the properties preceding the proof, it is
suﬃcient to show, ∀g ≥ 0a n d∀i ∈ N, that pi ∈ Xi(g + 1) if there exists a belief
system with pi ∈ C
t(ω)
i for some ω ∈ KgA. This is established by induction.ADMISSIBILITY AND COMMON BELIEF 25
(g = 0) Suppose pi ∈ Si\Xi(1) = Si\˜ ai(Sj). Then there exists xi ∈ ∆(Si) s.t. xi
weakly dominates si on Sj. Write xSj for the act on Sj that xi c a nb ev i e w e da s ,
and write ySj for the act on Sj that si c a nb ev i e w e da s .L e tti = ti(ω) for some
ω ∈ K0A = A. Since ω ∈ A ⊆ [ui]∩[caui], it follows that xSj  
ti
Sj ySj. Hence, there
does not exist a belief system with pi ∈ C
ti(ω)
i for some ω ∈ K0A if pi ∈ Si\Xi(1).




(g>0) Assume that it has been established, ∀g  =0 ,...,g−1a n d∀i ∈ N, that
pi ∈ Xi(g  + 1) if there exists a belief system with pi ∈ C
t(ω)
i for some ω ∈ Kg

A.
Suppose pi ∈ Xi(g)\Xi(g +1 )=Xi(g)\˜ ai(Xj(g)). Then there exists xi ∈ ∆(Si)
s.t. xi strongly dominates si on Xj(g), which implies that, ∀ (∅  =) Qj ⊆ Xj(g), xi
strongly dominates si on Qj. Write xSj for the act on Sj that xi can be viewed as,
and write ySj for the act on Sj that si can be viewed as. Let x and y be acts on
Sj ×Tj that satisfy x(sj,t j)=xSj(sj)a n dy(sj,t j)=ySj(sj) for all (sj,t j). Then,
∀ (∅  =) Qj ⊆ Xj(g), xQj×Tj weakly dominates yQj×Tj.L e t ti = ti(ω) for some
ω ∈ KgA. Since KgA ⊆ KiKg−1A and C
tj(ω
)
j ⊆ Xj(g) whenever ω  ∈ Kg−1A,




j ⊆ Xj(g). Hence, ∀ (∅  =) βj ⊆ [ratj]j ∩ κ
ti
j , xβj
weakly dominates yβj, and, since ω ∈ [ui] ∩ Bi[ratj], x ti y and xSj  
ti
Sj ySj.
Hence, there does not exist a belief system with pi ∈ C
ti(ω)
i for some ω ∈ KgA if
pi ∈ Xi(g)\Xi(g+1). This means that pi ∈ Xi(g+1) if there exists a belief system
with pi ∈ C
ti(ω)
i for some ω ∈ KgA.
Proof of Proposition 4. It is suﬃcient to show that one can construct a belief system
with A0 =Ω=S ×{ t1}×{ t2} such that, ∀i ∈ N, suppxi ⊆ C
ti
i , whenever
(x1,x 2) is a proper equilibrium. Let (x1,x 2) be a proper equilibrium. By Blume,
Brandenburger & Dekel’s [16] Prop. 5, there exists a pair of preferences,  t1 and
 t2, that are represented by υ
t1
1 and λt1 =( µ
t1
1 ,...) ∈ L∆(S2 ×{ t2}), and υ
t2
2
and λt2 =( µ
t2
1 ,...) ∈ L∆(S1 ×{ t1}), respectively — with υ
t1
1 ◦ z = u1 and,
∀s2 ∈ S2, µ
t1
1 (s2,t 2)=x2(s2), and υ
t2
2 ◦ z = u2 and, ∀s1 ∈ S1, µ
t2
1 (s1,t 1)=x1(s1)
— satisfying, ∀i ∈ N, (i) suppxi ⊆ C
ti
i , (ii) κ
ti
j = Sj ×{ tj},a n d(iii) (rj,t j)  
(sj,t j) whenever rj  tj sj. Properties (ii) and (iii) imply that  ti is admissible
on C
tj
j ×{ tj} =[ ratj]j ∩ κ
ti
j . By letting Ω = S ×{ t1}×{ t2}, it follows that
Ω=[ u1]∩[cau1]∩B0
1[rat2]∩[u2]∩[cau2]∩B0
2[rat1]=A0. Hence, by property (i),
A0 =Ω=S ×{ t1}×{ t2} and, ∀i ∈ N, suppxi ⊆ C
ti
i .
Proof of Proposition 5. Part 1: If πi is fully permissible, then there exists a belief
system with πi = C
ti(ω)
i for some ω ∈ CK ¯ A0. It is suﬃcient to show that one can
construct a belief system with ¯ A0 =Ω=S × T1 × T2 such that, ∀i ∈ N, ∀πi ∈ Πi,
there exists ti ∈ Ti with πi = C
ti
i . Construct a belief system with, ∀i ∈ N,a
one-to-one mapping σi : Ti → Πi from the set of types to the the set of fully





j ), where Q
ti
j := {sj ∈ Sj|∃σj ∈ Ψ
ti
j s.t. sj ∈ σj}.
Determine the set of opponent types that ti does not deem Savage-null as follows:
T
ti
j = {tj ∈ Tj|σj(tj) ∈ Ψ
ti
j }.L e t  ti satisfy that υ
ti
i ◦ z = ui and that x ti y
iﬀ xβj weakly dominates yβj for βj = β
ti





j = Sj ×T
ti





since xSj  
ti
Sj ySj iﬀ xQj weakly dominates yQj for Qj = Q
ti
j or Qj = Sj, implying
that, ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti ∈ Ti, β
ti
j =[ ratj]j ∩ κ
ti
j . Hence, S × T1 × T2 = ¯ A0
1 × ¯ A0
2 = ¯ A0.26 GEIR B. ASHEIM AND MARTIN DUFWENBERG
Part 2: If there exists a belief system with πi = C
ti(ω)
i for some ω ∈ CK ¯ A0,
then πi is fully permissible. Consider any belief system for which CK ¯ A0  = ∅. Let,
∀i ∈ N, T 
i := {ti(ω)|ω ∈ CK ¯ A0} and Ξi := {C
ti
i |ti ∈ T 
i}. Note that, ∀i ∈ N and
∀ti ∈ T 
i,( sj,t j) is Savage-null acc.  ti if tj ∈ Tj\T 
j since CK ¯ A0 = KCK ¯ A0 ⊆
KiCK ¯ A0, implying that T
ti
j ⊆ T 
j. Since, ∀i ∈ N and ti ∈ T 
i, x  ti y iﬀ xβj
weakly dominates xβj for βj = β
ti
j =[ ratj]j ∩ κ
ti
j or βj = κ
ti
j = Sj × T
ti
j ,i t
follows that xSj  
ti
Sj ySj iﬀ xQj weakly dominates yQj for Qj = Q
ti
j or Qj = Sj,
where Q
ti
j := {sj ∈ Sj|∃σj ∈ Ψ
ti




j |tj ∈ T
ti
j }⊆Ξj.





i , and Ξ ⊆ α(Ξ). Hence,
by Prop. 1(iii), πi ∈ Πi if there exists a belief system with πi = C
t(ω)
i for some
ω ∈ CK ¯ A0.
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